New Reflections on the "Revolutionary" Politics of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe Benjamin Bertram
In the course of the "public" debate on the North American Fre Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993, the Clinton administration, as well as economists, business leaders, and other politicians, repeatedly used t word dislocation to describe the "temporary" effects (i.e., unemployment many workers would encounter from the trade agreement. Dislocation is hardly unique to workers in the United States; the ever shifting global flo of capital constitutes and undermines the survival and sense of stability location) of vast numbers of people around the world. And unemploymen is only one aspect of dislocation. For many, dislocation is the disjunction between the desire for meaningful, life-sustaining work and the maximi tion of profit, the transnational flow of money often accompanied by viole shifts of manufacturing space.
When dislocation was bandied about during the debate on NAFTA, i meant more than the displacement of workers; it resonated with many po modern celebrations of the "dislocated subject." In 1985, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe published Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, which remains one of the most sophisticated and important explications of the theoretical link between poststructuralist theory and postmodern political practice. The book emphasizes the new political possibilities that have become available since World War II, when the "'commodification' of social life destroyed previous social relations, replacing them with commodity relations through which the logic of capitalist accumulation penetrated into increasingly numerous spheres."1 This new social life should be viewed with optimism, they argue, since, as Laclau puts it in his recent book, New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time (1990) , the "dislocatory rhythm of capitalism" has created new antagonisms in political life.2 Capitalism and rapid technological change, he argues, are the preconditions for modern pragmatic, anti-essentialist, and historicist political views. Radical politics should no longer be understood as a collective struggle against a dominant system, then, but as a series of disconnected but potentially linkable nodes of resistance, or intertextuality. This kind of resistance, which thrives off of negation (without the Hegelian negation of the negation), creates numerous paradoxical, if not incoherent, statements about metaphysics and identity. Laclau argues that "the location of the subject is that of dislocation. . . . This is only possible if there is something in contemporary capitalism which really tends to multiply dislocations and thus creates a plurality of new antagonisms" (New Reflections, 41) . I would like to argue that Laclau and Mouffe fetishize "dislocation." Like NAFTA, the anti-essentialist celebration of pluralism and difference that plays a prominent role in the work of Laclau and Mouffe (as well as that of many other theorists of postmodern politics) has as its "traumatic kernel" the subjugation of workers and consumers under current market conditions.3 The dislocatory effects of highly advanced modes of profit maximization (corporate mobility in the post-cold war globalization o capital) have virtually dissolved the hope, defined in the great project of th Left, for a revolutionary intervention designed to change fundamentally th organization and meaning of labor and to generate new public and democratic power in economic life. While Laclau and Mouffe are unique in that their Marxist training still compels them to offer a historical explanation fo the economic underpinnings of anti-essentialism and subjectivity--something the vast majority of poststructuralist critics lack--nevertheless, their appropriation of Derridean and Lacanian notions of difference and lac which are crucial to their idea of fragmented social movements and ident ties, or dislocation, remains trapped in the notorious web of negation that characterizes these discourses. Laclau and Mouffe dismiss any notion o determinate negation and the dialectical motion of historical change. As a result, they are uninterested in any alternative to consumerism and repre sentative (liberal) democracy. Notions such as "public spiritedness," which have little political bite, provide the basis for fragmented social organizations. Under the yoke of this global "system," dislocation is inevitable. But is not inevitable that we attribute magical qualities to this new social cond tion of postmodernity. By retaining a historical sense of the trauma of thi condition and an a priori pessimism-of-strength about democratic politica power under the conditions of late capitalism, we can maintain a healthy desire for an alternative.
Laclau and Mouffe's argument for new social movements is now well known, at least in many academic circles. In 1987, Norman Geras published a scathing critique of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy in New Left Review. The article (entitled "Post-Marxism?") comes close to branding Laclau and Mouffe as heretics. Despite the ad hominem nature of his attack, Geras makes many astute comments. In particular, he notes that Laclau and Mouffe reduce all of Marxism to a crude economism and fail to acknowledge the importance of notions such as "relative autonomy" that have enriched Marxist theories of base and superstructure. Although many of Geras's criticisms are powerful, the article is marred by his unwillingness to grant any validity whatsoever to Laclau and Mouffe's attempt to theorize new social movements of a non-Marxist nature. My critique of dislocation focuses on particular weaknesses in Laclau and Mouffe's appropriation of poststructuralism and hermeneutics. The continuity and power of notions such as "dislocation" or "multiple subject positions" in recent debates over postmodernism and politics suggest that further criticism may be useful.
Laclau shows how dislocation, a key element of poststructuralist theory, has its roots in the economic dislocations of the late twentieth century. But these dislocations are never precisely located on the map of the world; instead, they are the grounds for a grand, universalizing, philosophical claim for fragmented subjectivities, or multiple subject positions. In this essay, I analyze the importance of this claim in Laclau and Mouffe's work as it is developed through a hermeneutic theory of discursive practices. The danger of this particular political form of hermeneutics, I argue in the final section, is that it cannot account for how we achieve what Slavoj Ziek calls "a minimum of consistency to our being-in-the-world" (Sublime, 75).
I compare and contrast Ziek's hermeneutical, phenomenological, psychoanalytic theory to the poststructuralist theory of Laclau and Mouffe. In the latter theory, there is little, if any, potential for what Gramsci called "a collective will." In the absence of any dialectical conception of negation, there is no possibility for positive identities to emerge. The dislocated subject is left in a perspectival position, one "nodal point" that does not allow for a larger view of the whole. This perspectival theory, I argue, is symptomatic of the reification of the "democratic consumer society" described by Laclau and Mouffe.4 Ziek's hermeneutic theory of ideology suggests that there are possibilities for intersubjectivity in contemporary politics and social life.
The word intersubjectivity is usually associated with Jirgen Habermas's work on communicative reason. Ziek, Laclau, and Mouffe are hostile to this Enlightenment model of rationality and transparency in political and social interactions. Unlike Laclau and Mouffe, Ziek follows Lacan's efforts to value the positivity of the "we" and the "I" as the necessary counterparts to their respective negations.
In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau and Mouffe refer to Claude Lefort's thesis that the democratic revolution, as a new terrain which supposes a profound mutation at the symbolic level, implies a new form of institu-4. Ernesto Laclau refers to Gramsci's "collective wills" as "unstable social agencies, with imprecise and constantly redefined boundaries, and constituted through the contingent articulation of a plurality of social identities and relations." I will later comment on this odd transformation of Gramsci into a postmodern pluralist. See Ernesto Laclau, "Power and Representation," in Politics, Theory, and Contemporary Culture, ed. Mark Poster (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 283. tion of the social. In earlier societies, organized in accordance with a theological-political logic, power was incorporated in the person of the prince, who was a representative of God-that is to say, of sovereign justice and sovereign reason. Society was thought as a body, the hierarchy of whose members rested upon the principle of unconditional order. (Hegemony, 186) Drawing from Lefort's L'invention Democratique, they argue that in moder democratic societies, there is no longer any "transcendental guarantor" with the power to establish a totally unified society. This end of unity is the onto logical and political basis for Laclau and Mouffe's definition of the social.
The breakdown of unconditional order allows human social relations to be regarded as unfixed and contingent. Laclau and Mouffe suggest that any attempt to definitively suture the social space results in totalitarianism. Yet, w must wonder whether Lefort's celebration of the end of unconditional order in the modern era, to which Laclau and Mouffe subscribe, is premature.
Dislocation has been important to Marxists as a means of understanding the shift in Europe from feudalism to capitalism. The emergence of wage labor in early market societies created a new form of oppression through enclosures and the generation of "free" laborers but simultaneously opened up new, long-term possibilities for an alternative to both the oppression of agrarian workers (located on the land) and that of wage laborers (dislocated and brought into factories). For Laclau and Mouffe, there is no alternative to the dislocatory effects of capitalism. Their work attempts to continue the project of liberal capitalism while altering some of its traditional assumptions about the subject (i.e., the bourgeois ego). Postmodern dislocation is an intensified form of the interpellation of the subject under late capitalism.
The consumer must have multiple subject positions in order to maximize his or her accumulation of economic goods and social services. The new antagonisms, as Laclau and Mouffe make clear, are best suited for the postindustrial society in which there is no opposition to a dominant system.
One of the most radical aspects of Laclau and Mouffe's conception of the social is its deconstruction of the public/private duality and of the relies on the force of negativity: "certain discursive forms, through equivalence, annul all positivity of the object and give a real existence to negativity as such. This impossibility of the real--negativity--has attained a form of presence" (Hegemony, 128). "Presence," for them, exists only paradoxically at the junctures of antagonisms and difference. There can be no positivity of being, and no polarity of being and not-being, but only the continual disintegration of all objective identities as fully articulated positions. Articulation is radical only insofar as it is radically unstable. There can be no underlying essence that might lend it the status of Truth. This destabilization of the subject undermines the basis of the classic Aristotelian separation of the bios politikos and oikia, since there is no longer any privileged realm of political activity (as in the polis). The politicization of the social occurs when we no longer view consumer "lifestyles" as private matters (housekeeping). The Left, then, can no longer believe it is battling against a few dominant ideological formations, since ideology is implicit in all social practices, from shopping to sexuality. This strategy has the advantage of foregrounding struggles hitherto repressed by the public/private dichotomy, such as feminism, gay/lesbian rights, and environmentalism. However, it often has the disadvantage of leveling major political disputes to a matter of "lifestyles" in the age of late capitalism.5
For Laclau and Mouffe, the decentering of the subject is a key moment in the great modern expansion of pluralism. The death of "Man" (which accompanies the death of the centered subject), however, does not entail the end of humanist values. In fact, Laclau and Mouffe want to envision a "real humanism" (i.e., a historicized humanism) (New Reflections, 245). The numerous writings by Laclau and Mouffe provide some of the most sustained and comprehensive philosophical and political arguments of the academic Left in the last two decades. Yet, since they appropriate so much from a wide array of disparate thinkers, their work has been linked to agendas radically different from their own. Unlike many hermeneutic thinkers of the post-1968 variety, Laclau and Mouffe do not have a separatist, antihumanist, or postliberal agenda. They believe that once we historicize and localize the great emancipatory movements for equality and the "rights of Man," these movements will become more meaningful. There are those for whom the current critique of rationalism and universalism puts into jeopardy the very basis of the democratic project. Others argue that the critique of essentialism-a point of convergence of the most important trends in contemporary theory:
post-structuralism, philosophy of language after the later Wittgenstein, post-Heideggerian hermeneutics--is the necessary condition for understanding the widening of the field of social struggles characteristic of the present stage of democratic politics. Phronesis clearly locates itself among the latter.6
The shift from rationalism and more traditional epistemological assumptions to hermeneutics has important political consequences. By "hermeneutics,"
I will be referring generally to a number of theoretical views that utilize a process Derrida says was first implemented by Nietzsche: "Radicalizing the concepts of interpretation, perspective, evaluation, difference," and the "liberation of the signifier from its dependence of derivation with respect to the logos and the related concept of truth or the primary signified, in whatever sense that is understood."7 Derrida is certainly one of the most important post-Heideggerian hermeneutic thinkers. The "post" here cannot be overemphasized. One of Heidegger's motives in critiquing Western metaphysics (especially the Cartesian ego) was to find a new home, a new location, for Being. Whereas Laclau and Mouffe celebrate alienated modern subjectivity, Heidegger, the "conservative revolutionary," mournfully declared that "the essence of the modern age can be seen in the fact that man frees himself from the middle ages in freeing himself to himself."8 For Heidegger, modern individualism and the idea of "man" (man as the measure of all things) have few redeeming qualities. Laclau is more in the progressive spirit of Marxism 6. Phronesis is a term borrowed from Aristotle's tripartite division of science into theoretical, practical, and productive forms of knowledge. Phronesis means "practical reason."
For Aristotle, theoria is the highest form of knowledge, but it, nevertheless, is only possible with the use of practical knowledge. Laclau and Mouffe use phronesis in strict opposition to theoria, however. Phronesis, in their political philosophy, is antitheoretical and pragmatic, in that it resists any larger, metaphysical claims for its own conditions of possibility.
when he announces the importance of contingency, in this case the existential recognition that all meaning is a human construct. He has nothing in common with Heidegger's despair over the disappearance of the gods, which Heidegger believed had led humanity toward total nihilism. Hermeneutics, in the Derridean definition given above, moves entirely away from its older religious context; it emphasizes the radical instability of all interpretation. The logos, or primary signified, disappears without any belief in a transcendental authority or in fixed essences.
In addition to Derrida's work, Laclau and Mouffe recruit a large number of twentieth-century thinkers under the banner of anti-essentialism.
Freud, Heidegger, Lacan, and others have shown how the subject lacks a transparent consciousness (as in the Cartesian cogito). It is always formed by what Heidegger calls "pre-understanding"; Gadamer, the "fore-structures of knowledge"; Freud, the unconscious. The subject, in Laclau and Mouffe's account, thus cannot conceive of society as transparent, either. Both the subject and society lack any a priori status; they are constructed discursively.
In Hermeneutics as Politics (1987) , Stanley Rosen argues that hermeneutics (in its postmodern form) amounts to a bourgeois quietism. Hermeneutics, which he understands as a move toward historicity, always stresses the private, artistic affairs of the individual (as exemplified by Nietzsche and Heidegger). Hermeneutics, the glorification of interpretation and perspectivism, is both a continuation of the Enlightenment project (the liberal defense of human rights and the rights of the individual) and the destruction of the Enlightenment concern for reason and truth. Thus, Rosen argues that "postmodernism is the Enlightenment gone mad," informing us that postmodernism has not surpassed the Enlightenment, it is merely a "decadent" form of it.9 For him, the postmodern critique of totalizing discourses is a symptom of political fatigue. This argument is not unfamiliar.
But just as Laclau reminds us that there is no inherent political or apolitical agenda of poststructuralism, we might add that there is no politics of hermeneutics, either. Nevertheless, Rosen's polemical stance is preferable to the conclusions of Stanley Fish, who is the embodiment of political fatigue par excellence. These two thinkers, Fish and Rosen, make a similar argument about the political possibilities of "negative" theory (deconstruction): the Left is seriously deluded in its belief that hermeneutic theory (Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Derrida, Gadamer, etc.) This new faith in "the liberating effect" (New Reflections, 53) of bureaucratization and commodification, they suggest, is not completely antithetical to Marxism, since it sees capitalism as the important basis of other political opportunities. The difference, of course, is that they are not thinking in terms of "totalizing" notions such as the dialectic of historical materialism (the imminence of socialism).
Whatever the allure of this sophisticated hermeneutic theory of social and political life, its power is dependent on its conversion effect-that is, its ability to convince us not only that the rationalism and universalism of Marxism is invalid but also that older humanist concerns about alienation need to be discarded along with the deeply antibourgeois, antimodern views vital to other postmodern theorists, such as Foucault or Lyotard. As we shall see, the conflation of the political with the social, inspired by the move to hermeneutics, runs the danger of becoming another version of pragmatism: has not been "transferred in toto" to these corporations (New Reflections, 59 ). Laclau tries to dispel both the older "myth" of unregulated liberal capitalism (there never was any "pure" capitalism) and that of the "limitless capacity for decision-making" of corporations under monopoly capitalism today (New Reflections, 59). Whether or not this assessment is accurate 10. In her recent book, The Return of the Political, Chantal Mouffe supports Rorty's pragmatism while criticizing his failure to distinguish between economic liberalism and political liberalism. She recognizes the failure of modern capitalist societies to generate the condition for some kind of "civic republicanism" but also wants to reject any kind of communitarian or Marxist theory of a "true democracy." Thus, she insists we need to maintain a tension between a "democratic logic of equivalence" and a "liberal logic of difference." See Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political (London: Verso, 1993). cannot be discussed here. It is clear, however, that these "dislocated" consumers, whose desires are at the heart of new social movements, need to be located on the global map. The decline of the nation-state, as Masao Miyoshi has recently argued, has not put an end to colonialism. The complexity of multi-and transnational corporate economic and political activity should not deter us from trying to understand who benefits from the new mobility of capital."1 Who, precisely, lives in a "democratic consumer society"; who benefits from being "interpellated as consumers" (Hegemony, 164)? It would appear that Laclau has no problem using the word society, which he has declared "impossible," when it fits his own assessment of contempo 12. This view of the liberatory quality of modern and postmodern pluralism seems naive when compared to less optimistic genealogies of the modern subject. Foucault's theory of localized resistance, for example, has no interest in democracy and socialism. The confusion of Laclau and Mouffe's nodal points and Foucault's theory of subjugated discourses is common. Foucault argues that the giant machinery of power in the modern age (i.e., panopticism) can only be resisted in small pockets on the micro-level. In Sur- on difference and indeterminacy) has to be understood in terms of French history, especially the violence of the Revolution. The connection of writing, or "literature," and politics has a tragic and dangerous position in a place such as France, where, "the question of legitimacy may be posed at each instant"; Americans, English, and Germans have trouble understanding dcriture because it is inextricably linked to "this memory of crime."13 In the Derridean lexicon, dcriture is contrasted to phonocentrism and logocentrism (though not set in strict opposition). In his early work on Husserl, Speech and Phenomena, and throughout his career, Derrida has attempted to combat the idea that speech has any primacy or special presence that is more authentic or closer to the Being or essence of the speaker than writing. All speech is a form of writing. Derrida's work attempts to erase the "phonocentric" qualities of writing, the little voice that the reader believes creates unified or determinate meanings. This emphasis on the plurality of meanings in language and culture has a vital connection to the "tragic" and of the Second International, they show the dangers of believing that certain subjects can be given a positive representation, that they can be located in one position. They replace representation with the more fluid "articulation.
The advantage of this term is that it reveals how class identity is merely on discursive construct among others; it has no a priori status. "Class," as political category, does not disintegrate but rather is seen as one point in series of democratic struggles. By eliminating this principle of representa tion, the authoritarian impulse of vanguardism disappears as well.
The fact that "identity is never positive" is the basis for their view of "antagonisms." There may be a Hegelian argument here, but they a tempt to move quickly beyond it: "For him [Hegel] , identity is never positi and closed in itself, but is constituted as transition, relation, difference" (Hegemony, 95). They object, of course, to Hegel's move beyond nega tion to a higher form of rationality. Nevertheless, Hegel is vital to the post Enlightenment project of hermeneutics because he opened up the expl ration of the historicity of being.
Antagonism, however, does not operate in terms of any particular Hegelian or Marxist logic of contradiction. Both theories, they insist, depen on a rationalistic understanding of the endogenous movement of history.
Therefore, having abandoned a teleological view of history, they no longe see the historical inevitability of class antagonisms. Their principle of antagonism goes further than that, however, in that it reveals "the limits of a objectivity" (Hegemony, 125) . Antagonism is based neither on conceptu contradictions (as in Hegel) nor on concrete, physical struggles. Instead, it functions through the subject's lack of a full identity: "The presence of the 'Other' prevents me from being totally myself. The relation arises not from full totalities, but from the impossibility of their constitution" (Hegemony 125). As we will see with Lacanian psychoanalysis (as proposed by Slavo Ziwek), the impossibility of society resembles the impossibility of the Rea Antagonisms are always external to the subject without having any positiv existence "out there." That is, they are neither subjective nor objective bu are rather discursive constructs.
Hermeneutics as politics relies upon the Heideggerian destruktion of traditional Western ontology. But Heidegger, according to Derrida, is still too concerned with the "primordial homeland" of language and Being.14 The Derridean critique of the "metaphysics of presence" is important to Laclau and Mouffe for the following reason: it enables them to argue that society and the subject exist only within the infinite play of diffdrance; that is, to use their quotation from L'dcriture et la diffdrence, "in the absence of a centre or origin, everything became discourse. ... The absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain and the play of signification infinitely" (Hegemony, 112) . This so-called Nietzschean dance is the basis of the indeterminacy of the social -hegemonic formations are discursive constructs. In terms of (inter)subjectivity, the result is that the activist should not expect to find any kind of complete self-actualization in politics but rather a continual deferral of meaning, partially stabilized by "nodal points,"15 in the vortex of differance.
This theory of the subject adds an intriguing twist to their critique of traditional (especially economic) liberalism. Freedom, for Laclau, is not self-determination; there is no subject located in the absence of structural identity. Instead, freedom is the result of what he calls a "failed structural identity" (New Reflections, 44). The subject is free not because it exists outside of institutional control, or externals; it is free because it is dislocated.
The more opaque the social is, the more possibilities there are for the subject to be interpellated by hegemonic practices: "Every identity is dislocated insofar as it depends on an outside which both denies that identity and provides its conditions of possibility at the same time" (New Reflections, 39).16
The category of the subject, which they insist is actually that of multiple subject positions, is only understood through its historicity or contingency and its (dis)location in a world of textual diffdrance. As Derrida points out, the word difference has its Latin root in differre, which has the twofold meaning of "to defer" or "to delay" and "to scatter." Thus, the subject can only be understood in terms of its lack of presence and its inability to use language to obtain full identity or self-consciousness. This is the key to the anti-utopian idea that any totalizing view of the social is, in effect, the desire to create a transparent and, hence, totalitarian society. In a harmonious society, we would, in fact, be radically unfree, since we could no Gramsci's work is crucial to Laclau and Mouffe's thinking on this ter, since his notion of "historical blocs" moves from the rationalism and universalism of Marx toward a theory of a less unified social space. The work of Gramsci and Althusser, they believe, is a step in the right direction, since we need to begin to look at the multiple sites of contestation in any social space. But unlike these so-called essentialist thinkers, they see Marx, to a great extent, as the Other. Both Gramsci and Althusser help us to see ideology as operative in many different practices, but they do not go far enough in terms of their break with the essentialist theory of base/superstructure. For Laclau and Mouffe, there is only superstructure, since there can be no underlying reality or truth to our political or economic life. Further, "superstructure" is replaced by "discursive practices."
Although their neologistic term nodal points has much in common with Gramsci's notion of "historical blocs" and the "war of positions," it involves a much greater dispersion of subject positions as a means of avoiding the two problems they associate with Gramsci: first, it does not accept class as the privileged signifier for the "hegemonic subject"; and, second, it does not envision a "single hegemonic center" (Hegemony, 138). Their theory of hegemonic formations is crucial to our discussion, since it is as close as they come to describing anything like intersubjectivity. Unlike Gramsci, they do not believe that a hegemonic force necessarily divides the social space into two camps. They call these "popular struggles" and suggest that in certain situations, particularly in the Third World, such struggles might be constructed tendentially (Hegemony, 137) . This theoretical move is an attempt to counter the obvious criticism that their work is useful only in advanced capitalist countries and is consistent with their general belief in the liberatory possibilities inherent in social systems that allow for greater effects of dislocation. We might say that they have their own theory of uneven and combined development: advanced industrial nations have the greater capacity for manufacturing dislocated subjects. Laclau and Mouffe have tried to give a defense of this use of discursive practices against charges (particularly by Marxists) of idealism. Th problem is important since, in the absence of the determination of objectiv material conditions (i.e., class interests), there appears to be no basis fo any unified political struggle. The alternative they supply is that hegemonic formations exist on a metonymic chain without any ultimately privileged signifier; there is no unified struggle for "democracy" in any transcenden tal sense ("justice" and "the rights of Man" are now offered secundum quid). They insist that they do not accept the dichotomy between realism and idealism that is the basis of such a criticism of discourse as havin purely "mental" characteristics. They do not make the mistake, we might say, that Marx said of the "young Hegelians," who "had the idea that men were drowned in water only because they were possessed with the idea of gravity."18 Discourse, as they define it, has a material character. To use the examples, one cannot dispute an earthquake or the falling of a brick. But this does not mean that we can understand these occurrences objective (i.e., without the mediation of language). Wittgenstein's theory of languagegames serves our purposes, then, because it allows us to see how divers institutional arrangements are socially constructed. Relations of power, in Laclau and Mouffe's language, are contingent but not necessary.
Gramsci's essentialist theory of historical blocs has the advantage of salvaging at least some sense of what Marx called objective materia conditions.19 In Hegemony, Laclau and Mouffe do not historicize Gramsci's "ambivalent" position with regard to the working class. The fact that he actually helped start the Italian Communist Party should explain his essentialist view of class. While they appropriate a great deal of Gramsci's work they want to give hegemony a deconstructive logic. The subject cannot be located in any stable position; it must be dispersed throughout the "unfixity of any social space. They never make it clear how any socialist projec could be actualized as merely one nodal point among others. This decon structive logic shifts our attention almost entirely over to cultural problem subject positions. Whether or not we choose to abandon an essentialist understanding of a unified working class, it is unclear that this "new pluralism" is the basis of our "liberation." The Gramscian notion of "ideology," in this context, is merely a justification for the leveling of all political projects and the failure to account for why or how a collective will is formed. Laclau and Mouffe, like Gramsci, believe in a "pessimism of the intellect," but they seem to have forgotten the latter part of Gramsci's well-known line, the "optimism of the will."
Points de capiton
The vast and complex history of the term ideology will not be ex- This passage presents a Gordian knot for the would-be political activist/theorist. What we have here is not exactly the "end of ideology," but it does fall into a similar trap through its own performative contradiction. As we saw earlier, the implosion of the social, the destruction of all political intersubjectivity, is supposedly avoided through the possibility of nodal points, which partially fix meaning in the metonymic chain. The social remains a sphere of overdetermination, then, while allowing for certain limited forms of political resistance. What remains enigmatic, however, is the assertion that ideology, the will to totality, is characterized as both non-recognition and as constitutive of the social. This is a subtle, if not casuistic, argument. On the one hand, the ideologue is someone who has not entered into the proper academic discourse, or interesting conversation, as Rorty puts it. That is, he or she has not been properly trained in the history of poststructuralist linguistics. On the other hand, the ideologue provides the necessary condition for any type of hegemonic practice. The problem here is that the activist has no choice other than to essentialize; that is, he or she must accept the metaphysical possibility of a better social order and the will-to-power that is implicit in any ideological fantasy. In either case, the desire for utopia, as Laclau asserts, is the "essence of any communication or social practice."
Is this an ironic assertion? We might call it a performative contradiction for the following reason: it suggests that we must essentialize in order to communicate, while maintaining an ironic sense about this very communicative act. Laclau is being ideological at the same time that he is undermining the basis of ideology. The theorist, then, recognizes that he or she is merely essentializing whenever he or she engages in politics. This seems remarkably close to what Peter Sloterdijk calls "enlightened false consciousness," which describes the state of those whose "consciousness no longer feels affected by any critique of ideology; its falseness is already reflexively buffered."23 In this case, it is not someone who, through cynicism, continues to damage the lives of others without any self-deception. Instead, it can be the hermeneutic theorist who continually deconstructs all truth claims for the sheer jouissance of acting as the Universal Refuter, or skeptic. Laclau has not escaped the perpetual process of unmasking that Sloterdijk labels "cynical reason." His form of ideologiekritik insists that those who do not recognize the infinite play of differences are unenlightened. As Slajov Zifek tells us, however, "even if we keep an ironical distance [from our actions], we are still doing them" (Sublime, 33). The question remains, once we've become ironic about ideology, Why shouldn't we triumphantly declare the end of ideology? Are Laclau and Mouffe ironic when they say that society is "impossible" and then proceed to use the word society when it fits their own ideological interests? We live in a "democratic society"; we are "interpellated as consumers"; we cannot imagine an alternative to capitalism. Man is-Hegel dixit-"an animal sick unto death," an animal extorted by an insatiable parasite (reason, logos, language). In this perspective, the "death drive," this dimension of radical negativity, cannot be reduced to an expression of alienated social conditions, it defines la condition humaine as such: there is no solution, no escape from it; the thing to do is not to "overcome," to "abolish" it, but to come to terms with it, to learn to recognize it in its terrifying dimension and then, on the basis of this fundamental recognition, to try to articulate a modus vivendi with it. (Sublime, 5)
Once again, we are told to view utopianism as the dangerous attempt to "suture" the social sphere. The difficulty with this view is that it suggests we have the capacity to be ironic about ideology (the will-to-totality) while we are being ideological. How does the activist set limits on her or his destructive will-to-power without falling into complacency, or the end of ideology (History-Hegel said-is a slaughterbench)? The decentering of the subject for Stanley Fish or Richard Rorty is the grounds for skepticism, which runs ad infinitum. The openness of the social and the dislocation of the subject creates irony, not the trench warfare of different political projects.
As with Laclau and Mouffe, we are trapped in the paradoxical situation of thinking in utopian terms about the end of utopia. But that should not stop us from continuing. Just as we cannot abolish antagonism (without being totalitarian), we cannot abolish ideology or the attempt to fix meaning in the social. The idea of a post-ideological society is misguided, Ziek shows, for the following reason:
If our concept of ideology remains the classic one in which the illusion is located in knowledge, then today's society must appear postideological: the prevailing ideology is that of cynicism; people no longer believe in ideological truth; they do not take ideological propo-sitions seriously. The fundamental level of ideology, however, is not of an illusion masking the real state of things but that of an (unconscious) fantasy structuring our social reality itself. And at this level, we are of course far from being a post-ideological society. Cynical distance is just one way-one of many ways-to blind ourselves to the structuring power of ideological fantasy: even if we do not take things seriously, even if we keep an ironical distance, we are still doing them. (Sublime, 33) Ziek uses the Lacanian meconnaissance to help redefine ideology. We are always distanced (with language as the mediation) from the objects of the Real (understood as the Lack). What Ziek shows is that ideology exists even if we don't grasp exactly what it is. It is embedded in our daily practices. The belief that ideology is an illusion, however, does not necessarily imply that there is any nonideological ground to stand on (i.e., there is no "true" consciousness). Ideology is dialectical. He reworks a line by Sloterdijk to read: "They know very well how things really are, but they still are doing it as if they did not know" (Sublime, 32). The ideologies of daily practices are not transparent and can never be made transparent (the desire for transparence is "totalitarian"). An individual's self-deception, indeed the self-deception of an entire society, is an inescapable datum. Ziek's theory works on the importance of form in all interpretation. Marx, he argues (following Lacan), was the first to invent the symptom in his analysis of the commodity form. Marx set up a vital method of political hermeneutics by showing how the commodity form conceals the materiality of objects of exchange and the labor that is built into the inherent nature of the object. In Ziek's idiosyncratic reading, there is no "hidden kernel," no real object that is latent under commodity exchange. The process of understanding life under capitalism is like that of analyzing a dream. The dream itself cannot be uncovered, but its manifest content, which is itself the form of the dream (displacement, condensation, etc.) can be made accessible through interpretation. The meaning of the symptom is generated through fantasy. It is the dialectical means we have of arriving at some form of psychic identity.
For example, Marx made feudalism the Other and thus enabled us to recognize our relation to the exchange-value of objects in contradistinction to the use-value of objects.
Ziek's hermeneutic theory is useful because it recuperates a notion of ideology. The fantasy of subjects under capitalist economies is that of commodity fetishism -the misrecognition of social relations for the relations between things. For Ziek, there is no space outside ideological fantasy (as in Althusser's distinction between ideology and science): "Ideology is a social reality whose very existence implies the non-knowledge of its participants as to its essence" (Sublime, 21). Nevertheless, there are always ways of interrogating our ideological thoughts (as there are ways of analyzing dreams). Ideology is not only in the "knowing" (as in the rational or reflective model) but in the "doing." One example he gives is that we may know that money has "nothing magical about it," but we continue to use it as if it did (Sublime, 31).
Although Laclau tries to borrow from this part of Ziek's work (in the passage cited earlier on ideology), the difference between these two theories is important. For Ziek, ideology is indeed misrecognition, but not merely of the infinite play of differences. Misrecognition is part of the very structure of human (un)consciousness, and ideology has very real consequences in terms of human relations. Fantasy is the path toward a greater understanding of the Real (which has no independent existence), as Freud recognized when he placed so much importance on the dream-work rather than on the dream itself.
Ziek's answer to the question "Why is there something rather than nothing at all?" is useful here: "the Symptom." This Lacanian answer may offer a partial solution to the problem I have identified with Laclau and Mouffe. In Ziek's reading, psychoanalysis offers the "necessary counterpoint" to the deconstruction of "substantial identity" (Sublime, 72). Laclau and Mouffe do not offer this possibility. Laclau's theory of the freedom of the subject as "failed structural identity" fails to give an adequate account of what gives us "a minimum of consistency to our being-in-the-world" (Sublime, 75) . The formulation of a Symptom does not involve a determination of the essence of the subject, but it is a construction that enables us to avoid madness:
If the symptom in this radical dimension is unbound, it means liter ally "the end of the world"-the only alternative to the symptom i nothing: pure autism, a psychic suicide, surrender to the death driv even to the total destruction of the symbolic universe. That is why t final Lacanian definition of the end of the psychoanalytic process identification with the symptom. The analysis achieves its end wh the patient is able to recognize, in the Real of his symptom, the on support of his being. That is how we must read Freud's wo es war, soil ich werden: you, the subject, must identify yourself with the pl where your symptom already was; in its "pathological" particularity you must recognize the element which gives consistency to your being. (Sublime, 75) What was lacking in Laclau and Mouffe was a developed theory of the Lack.
Although they prevent their theory from collapsing into total negativity (contingency only subverts necessity; we cannot have the opposite of necessity, which would be an empty totality), it still fails to answer the question that is crucial to the formation of a theory of ideology: Why is there something rather than nothing? Nodal points can only function as an "ideological quilt," a partial stabilization of the social (the requirement for any political activity), if we have at least some explanation of the desire for political intersubjectivity.24 Ziek sees the intersubjectivity of antagonism in Hegelian termsan "insatiable parasite (reason, logos, language)"--as well as Lacanian terms-enjoyment or jouissance (Sublime, 5). These latter terms exist as the surplus in the subject after interpellation. Ziek adds to Althusser's version of interpellation, or the internalization, of ideologies by insisting on the importance of "a residue or leftover" after the process of interpellation. The Lacanian and Hegelian aspect to the formation of subjectivity in this book is evident in Ziek's idea of reflexive determination. The subject, as for Lacan, is an S. This is not a vacuous negation but rather the path toward the negation of negation (the symptom), the support for being itself.
Intersubjectivity is generated through the "positive content," or "what I am for others" (Sublime, 46). Positive consistency also arrives through fantasy.
Illusion, fantasy, meconnaissance, misrecognition, and the symptom are all tied to our immediate need for gaining self-definition dialectically through others.
Ziek refers to the poststructuralist arguments of Hegemony as, "to use the good old Stalinist expression-'a dizziness from too much success.' "25 Laclau's notion of the "failed structural identity" of the subject is a reference to the Lacanian objet petit a, but it lacks the more complete, 24. My point here is not that Lacanian theory (e.g., d6sir) does provide an adequate solution to this problem. For Laclau and Mouffe, the subject of the lack and of indeterminacy often functions as a quick solution to problems in political theory. Ziek's Lacanian notion of the "symptom" is not the answer, but it seems to offer a little more than Laclau and to fetishize the dislocation of the subject. In these two works, the Lacanian "object a" is appropriated as a crude form of negation or lack. Lacania theory reveals the complexity of the subject's attempt to find wholeness i the symbolic order, the necessary fantasies and identifications of the subject with various unconscious objects of desire. Hermeneutic theory, which suggests that the relation between the part and the whole is circular, is important to Ziek and Lacan's work on identity and subjectivation. Yet, this circular process forecloses the possibility that negation can ever take o a real presence. Laclau and Mouffe, as we saw earlier, define the "axis o equivalence," the nodal point at which a collective is formed, as the point which "certain discursive forms, through equivalence, annul all positivity of the object and give a real existence to negativity as such. This impossibilit of the real -negativity -has attained a form of presence" (Hegemony, 128).
This form of Lacanian and Derridean theory relies on paradox as a form of logic. For Lacan and Ziek, however, negation and presence are not th same; they are dialectically linked as the part to the whole. The whole may be a fantasy, but it is a very real fantasy. The phallus, for example, offer an imaginary sense of the whole and positivity, without which the subject would disappear. There can be no presence as pure negation. The theor of the nodal point relies on total castration. Laclau and Mouffe's occasional use of the word society to describe the condition of postmodernity marks the return of the repressed. The desire for an imaginary phallus, the will-t totality, cannot always be rationally (mis)construed as the misrecognition of difference and indeterminacy. The hermeneutic play of genealogy needs to be the object of genealogical study. Thus, we need to look at anti-essentialism and its metonymic chain as symptomatic (in Ziek's sense) of particular, contingent social conditions. For our present concerns, this means that we cannot abandon the analysis of capitalism as a system. Ziek's criticism of postmodernism is only one way we can begin to take our playfulness seriously and recognize that anti-essentialism, or liberal pluralism, does not mark the end of history.
Hermeneutics as politics is not the final condition for political life.
The term politics has gone through a huge transformation in Laclau and Mouffe's work that gives it a pragmatic, as well as hermeneutic, flavor.
philosopher develops a perspective of all perspectives (a synoptic view) and can create new values based on practico-productive concerns. The role of the philosopher is to overcome chaos (i.e., differance). See The Question of Being (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993). They believe they have developed a "real humanism," a humanism that has been "historicized." The "great emancipatory goals" are now in the purview of pragmatism (New Reflections, ). An assortment of recent thinkers has elements of pragmatism in their work: Foucault, Derrida, Stanley Fish, Judith Butler, and many others share an interest in purging the desire for metaphysics, the absolute, Truth, Being, the transcendental signified, presence, ontology, identity, concepts, reason, and Man. Many of these thinkers have been able to carry their suspicion of the above terms into the productive sphere of political thinking. Like their radical, philosophical predecessors (particularly Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, and Heidegger), they work with what Paul Ricoeur has called a "hermeneutics of suspicion," the unmasking of particular claims that have concealed their real motives. A great deal of postmodern theory suggests that unmasking is an endless process, since there is ultimately nothing underneath surface meaning to be exposed (as in class struggle, sexual desire, etc.). A variety of political gains have been made through this process by activists who have challenged normative claims for heterosexuality, male dominance, white supremacy, and so forth. Ricoeur refers to this unmasking as a violent process. This "violence" is rarely acknowledged by poststructuralists, who generally argue that the hermeneutic process always leads toward pleasure or liberal tolerance. It is not only ideology critique that performs a kind of philosophical violence on others (as in the rationalistic conception of false consciousness) but all forms of deconstruction. The exposure of metaphysical or logocentric ideas is itself a means of gaining power. This problem of hermeneutical violence is crucial to Ziek's nonbiological discussion of the "death-drive," that "insatiable parasite," or "radical negativity" (Sublime, 4). Ziek's means of working out ideology as fantasy (and desire) is not to negate the will (and the violence of hermeneutics) but to come to terms with it by deploying a vital form of nontransparent intersubjectivity.
In her recent collection of essays, Mouffe argues that "a radical democratic interpretation .. . should lead to a common recognition among different groups struggling for an extension and radicalization of democracy that they have a common concern. .. 
